






















David Blandford  












Workshop on Agricultural Policy Reform and Adjustment 
Imperial College, Wye 
October 23-25, 2003  
 Overview of Adjustment Policies in Industrialized Countries 
David Blandford 
Penn State University 
 
Summary: Arguments for adjustment policies 
center on efficiency, equity and political economy 
considerations. The principal types of policies, 
targeted to individuals, firms or communities, are 
reviewed. A number of general issues relating to 
adjustment policies are identified. 
 
“Capitalism.. .is by nature a form or method of economic change and not only never is but never can 
be stationary… (the) process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism. It is what 
capitalism consists in and what every capitalist concern has got to live in.” Joseph A. Schumpeter, 
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. 
1. Introduction 
As the above quotation from Schumpeter indicates, a continuous process of (often dramatic) change is 
an enduring characteristic of capitalist economies. Adam Smith in his seminal work – the Wealth of 
Nations – discusses the ability of market economies to adjust to major changes using the example of 
the British economy’s absorption of returning soldiers and sailors at the Napoleonic Wars in the early 
eighteenth century (Smith).  
 
Among the forces creating the need for economic adjustment are changes in technology, 
demographics and consumer preferences. As the economies of industrial countries have become 
integrated more closely through the growth of international trade and investment – the process of 
“globalization” – the speed of change and the pressures for adjustment have intensified. 
 
The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of the types of policies used by industrial countries to 
address economic adjustment. Specific issues relating to the use of such policies in the food and 
agricultural sector are identified. 
2. Arguments for Adjustment Policies 
There has been a lively debate in the economics literature about the need for public policies to address 
economic change. The three areas on which the debate centered are: 1. economic efficiency; 2. equity; 
and 3. political economy. 
2.1 Efficiency 
Neo-classical economic theory provides little justification for government action to facilitate 
adjustment to change. In a perfectly competitive economy, resources (land, labor and capital) will be 
reallocated rapidly in response to exogenous or endogenous changes in the scarcity or productivity of 
resources or in underlying determinants of final demand. Prices will adjust to maintain equilibrium in 
both factor and product markets. The impact on the well-being of individuals will be determined by 
endowments of productive assets, changes in wages and rental rates, and impact of changes in the 
price of outputs on consumption. The resulting distributional implications are a natural outcome of a 
process that leads to an overall increase in economic welfare. In the neo-classical economy, the role of 
the government is limited to ensuring that the rules of the game are followed by all economic agents 
so that market forces can achieve a welfare-maximizing reallocation of resources. 
 
If we relax the assumptions that underlie the neo-classical model, in particular, the existence of 
perfect information and the frictionless reallocation of resources, adjustment costs may be incurred 
through output (and consumption) foregone as the economy moves from one equilibrium to another. 
  1This is the case set out by Bhagwati with respect to an increase in import competition, as reflected by 
a decline in the relative price of importables to exportables. In the Bhagwati example, rather than 
moving instantly from an initial point on the production possibility frontier, denoted by A, to the new 
equilibrium, denoted by C, an adjustment path exists that passes through an interior point, denoted by 
B (figure 1). The shape of the adjustment path is determined by the inflexibilities in resource 
reallocation. The more severe these inflexibilities, the farther to the left the path of adjustment will 
extend, and the greater will be the output foregone in the transition from A to C. 
 
 
Figure 1 Adjustment When Resources are Not Perfectly Mobile 
The existence of adjustment costs in this case is not sufficient to justify a greater role for government. 
The output foregone during economic adjustment may be a normal and unavoidable consequence of 
change. The path of adjustment can be economically efficient, in that adjustment costs are minimized 
without public action (Mussa). To justify such action, it would be necessary to establish that some or 
all of the costs of adjustment are potentially avoidable – in terms of figure 1, that there exists a 
feasible alternative adjustment path within the production possibility frontier that lies to the right of 
the path shown. It was also be necessary to show that there exists a feasible public intervention 
capable of moving the economy to the alternative adjustment path, and that the costs of this public 
intervention would be less than the resulting gain in economic welfare. Some economists argue that 
these necessary conditions rarely, if ever, apply (e.g., Banks and Tumlir). 
 
A second line of reasoning for public intervention on efficiency grounds in the adjustment process 
applies if goods are produced that are either not priced at all or are incorrectly priced in the market 
place. This is the classic argument relating to market failure given the existence of public goods or 
externalities. In that case, a welfare-maximizing reallocation of resources may require public action to 
correct the market failure. Again, public action can only be justified if public intervention is efficient 
– i.e., the resulting increase in economic welfare exceeds the costs of the intervention.  
 
A third and more complex situation applies when adjustment costs are created because of the 
existence of imperfect competition due to government action or inaction. Economists might argue that 
the appropriate “adjustment policy” in such a case would be to address the underlying distortion 
directly, rather than to use a secondary measure to try to offset the effects of the distortion. Some 






  2particularly on the basis of the alleged political infeasibility of adopting a first-best approach (Banks 
and Tumlir). 
2.2 Equity 
As indicated above, economic change is likely to have distributional implications due to its effects on 
factor and product prices in the presence of differences in factor endowments across individuals.  The 
Pareto principle suggests that if change results in some individuals being made better off, while no-
one is made worse off, that change is unequivocally beneficial. In reality, economic change is likely to 
make some individuals better off and others worse off. In that case, economic theory would suggest 
that if the winners can potentially compensate the losers and still be better off, the change is 
beneficial. Whether or not gainers should actually compensate losers is a separate issue relating to 
judgments about equity. Societies differ in the degree to which they try to influence the distributional 
outcome of economic change, and to compensate the losers. 
 
In most industrial societies there seems to be a general acceptance that individuals should not be left 
entirely on their own to absorb the losses that economic change can generate, although there are major 
differences in the amount of “social insurance” that societies are willing to provide. Support appears 
to be widespread for measures that help individuals to absorb the short-run impact of changes that are 
outside their control (unanticipated or exogenous changes). In many societies, there is also support for 
actions that help individuals adapt to the effects of changes in public policies. The greatest support in 
this area relates to the effects of changes in trade policies. Assistance can take various forms, for 
example, transfers to provide compensation for loss of income due to unemployment, whose basic 
aim is to allow the affected individuals to continue to enjoy a certain level of consumption. Measures 
may also be used to prepare individuals to increase their future income, e.g., by paying for retraining 
or providing financial assistance for relocation. Finally, measures may be used to compensate for 
reductions in wealth (reductions in asset values).  
 
In some cases, adjustment measures may be directed to firms or communities rather than to 
individuals, although the ultimate beneficiaries of such measures are those who are involved with 
such firms as employees or shareholders, or who live and work in targeted communities. 
2.3 Political Economy 
The final set of arguments that may underlie adjustment policies relate to political necessity or 
expediency. Those who stand to lose from economic change may be a vocal minority who are able to 
wield influence on the political process. When the source of adjustment is clearly identifiable, for 
example a change in government policies, there may be general sympathy among voters to address the 
resulting adjustment issues. Political pressure from firms and workers in declining industries may be 
so great that measures may be necessary to provide compensation or to facilitate adjustment. Without 
such measures it may not prove politically feasible to implement a proposed change. Losers may seek 
to block change, thus preventing the realization of gains by others. 
3. Types of Adjustment Policies 
The three main categories of adjustment policies are those targeted to: 1. workers; 2. firms and 3. 
communities.
1
3.1 Measures targeted to workers 
A number of measures can be targeted to workers (wage or salary employees) who are affected by 
economic change. The principal categories of measures are:  
1.  unemployment compensation 
2.  retraining programs or benefits 
                                                      
1 A number of studies have been produced of the range of adjustment policies used by industrial countries. One 
example is OECD (1975). 
  33.  job search and relocation benefits 
4.  severance payments and early retirement incentives. 
 
Unemployment compensation typically involves the payment of some portion of the worker’s 
previous salary or wages for a designated period of time. In order to be eligible for such payments 
workers typically have to pay some type of unemployment insurance during the period that they are 
employed. They may have to prove that their loss of employment was due to “involuntary” separation, 
i.e., was outside their control.  
 
A basic problem with unemployment compensation is that it may create incentive effects that create 
long-term efficiency problems and increase economic costs. For example, if program benefits are 
conditional on workers being in a disadvantaged state, beneficiaries may have an incentive to become 
or to remain disadvantaged. To avoid this problem, Brander and Spencer suggest that it is preferable 
to pay unconditional assistance, i.e., compensation regardless of whether an individual subsequently 
becomes re-employed. This could create incentives for workers to become re-employed in the shortest 
possible time, although eligibility criteria would have to be designed to prevent rent-seeking behavior 
through “job hopping” across firms in declining industries. An unconditional compensation scheme is 
likely to be more expensive than one in which benefits are linked to continued unemployment, since 
some workers will choose to take other employment if the alternative wage exceeds the value of the 
compensation plus the value of time in leisure. Schemes which provide unemployment compensation 
for a limited period of time, and in which the level of compensation declines through time are likely to 
create fewer disincentives to re-employment. However, if the overall economy is weak and 
unemployment is high, there may be a reluctance to reduce or withdraw benefits from displaced 
workers. 
 
Retraining schemes can take a variety of forms. Displaced workers can be compensated for the costs 
of undertaking an approved retraining program (tuition charges, travel expenses, child care expenses 
etc.). The assumption underlying such programs is that investment in human capital will increase the 
likelihood that the displaced worker will find alternative employment, and that the wages earned will 
be higher than would otherwise be the case. With a progressive tax system, this would lead to some 
“pay back” of the investment in human capital to society as a whole. It does not necessarily follow 
that the retrained worker will match earnings in their previous occupation, particularly if s/he has been 
displaced from a relatively highly-skilled job to a lesser-skilled job. There is no guarantee that a 
retrained worker will find alternative employment, particularly if the overall demand for labor in the 
economy is weak. In terms of the type of retraining undertaken, it is generally preferable that 
individuals make their own training choices rather than being directed to a particular form of 
retraining by the government – the government is unlikely to be the best judge of an individual’s 
capabilities or employment potential. However, public agencies can play a role in guiding training 
choices by individuals by disseminating information on employment opportunities. 
 
Assistance with job search and placement can extend to direct financial assistance, in addition to the 
provision of information. Payments can be provided to help offset travel costs for job interviews or 
the costs of moving to take up employment in a new location. This type of assistance can also be 
provided through the tax code by making such expenses deductible against income tax. 
 
In some cases, lump-sum severance payments are made to workers, based on the length of service. 
Recipients can use such a payment as a source of capital to set up their own businesses, as a source of 
income for retirement, or to support current consumption. Problems can arise when such payments are 
made as a substitute for accumulated retirement benefits, in that workers may not save such payments 
to fund their retirement, particularly if they are not close to retirement age. For elderly workers, 
incentives can be offered for early retirement, for example, through the provision of extra pension or 
other benefits (e.g., coverage of medical expenses while retired).  
 
Where unemployment benefits are provided on a long-term basis, this can create a considerable drain 
on public finances, particularly with the increase in life expectancy of the population’s of industrial 
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the aging of the population, reductions in the value of the assets that support private pensions, or the 
reliance on current wage earners to pay for the publicly-funded pensions of those who are retired. 
 
In the food and agricultural sector, particular issues may arise because of the prevalence of family, 
seasonal and part-time labor. Economic adjustment may involve involuntary unemployment in such 
categories of labor, but it may be difficult to identify those affected or to compensate them. Workers 
in these categories of employment may not be eligible for compensation or access to other adjustment 
schemes, since they are not in regular full-time employment. 
3.2. Measures targeted to firms 
Most of the adjustment measures provided to firms are targeted to the restructuring of existing 
activities, for example, through the installation of more modern equipment, or the transition to new 
activities, for example, away from iron and steel production towards metal fabrication. A range of 
measures can be used to achieve such changes, including, the provision of loans or grants for new 
investment or preferential tax treatment. In addition, technical assistance can be provided to assist 
firms with restructuring. It is relatively rare for compensation to be provided for reductions in asset 
values resulting from economic change, except in as much as direct incentives are provided to scrap 
obsolete plant. Firms may be able to offset losses in income or asset values against remaining income 
through the tax code. 
 
In the food and agricultural sector, particular issues may arise because of the importance of fixed 
assets, particularly land, for farm firms. Changes in the value of such assets associated with changes 
in policies are likely to be particularly significant for those affected, and for policymakers. As is well 
known, the effects of agricultural support tend to become capitalized into fixed assets.
2 When output 
controls are used, the capitalization of support may also apply to the “right to produce” – the 
production or marketing quota. 
 
While most of the measures identified above are targeted to the short and medium term, other 
measures can be targeted to the process of longer-term adjustment at the firm level. To the extent that 
the competitiveness of firms is linked to the technology that they employ, government support for 
research and development may provide an indirect way to facilitate change and adjustment. The 
degree to which such measures are effective in helping particular firms will depend on the extent to 
which new technologies are specific to those firms or to which the supply of intellectual property can 
be controlled so that it benefits them.  
 
Publicly funded research is relatively significant in the agricultural sectors of some countries, most 
notably the United States. The effects of this research on productivity is an important factor in 
creating pressure for adjustment, but the extent to which research can aid actively in the process of 
adjustment in the agricultural sector is also an important issue.  
 
The continued economic viability of farms may depend on an increase in the scale of farming and the 
size of farms. It may prove challenging to effect the necessary structural change if there are 
institutional rigidities that affect the transfer or sale of land, or if the rental market for farmland does 
not function efficiently. Institutional rigidities, some of which can be caused by policies, can 
complicate the adjustment process (OECD, 1998).  
3.3. Measures targeted to communities 
Community leaders may become involved in adjustment programs because of their concerns about the 
impact of economic change on the local economy, employment, and tax revenues. Local initiatives 
                                                      
2 As pointed out by the OECD (1998), the selling prices for land may not necessarily follow changes in output 
prices, particularly in the short term, for a variety of reasons. These include imperfections in the land market and 
differences between current earning from land (including potential earnings in non-agricultural uses) and 
expectations of future earnings. 
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through the use of tax dollars to improve infrastructure and services. Local governments and other 
agencies may also be the primary vehicle for the delivery of adjustment programs that are funded by 
regional or central governments. 
4. Some Issues in Adjustment Policies 
A number of general issues relating to adjustment polices can be identified. 
 
First, in so far as it is possible to generalize, it is likely that the pressure for governments to take 
action to address adjustment issues is likely to be greater the more important the following factors: 1. 
the geographical concentration of the industry affected by change; 2. the importance of the industry in 
the local or national economy, particularly in terms of employment; 3. the degree of mobility of 
workers in the industry, which may be a function of skill levels, as well as factors, such as age and 
attitude, which affect willingness and ability to learn new skills or to relocate to other areas. The 
perceived need for adjustment policies and programs is also likely to be higher if overall income and 
employment growth in the economy is low, or is concentrated in regions other than those affected by 
economic change.  
 
Second, there is the issue as to whether so-called adjustment measures actually promote adjustment, 
for example, through the downsizing or elimination of an industry that has become uncompetitive, or 
whether they simply provide a subsidy for an industry that is unlikely ever to be competitive. Many of 
the subsidies provided in industrial countries for the “modernization” of certain industrial sectors 
during the 1970s, such as shipbuilding and textiles, fall under this heading. Programs which involve 
investment subsidies or transfers that reduce labor costs in a given sector have been criticized most 
strongly on this basis (Banks and Tumlir). The provision of such subsidies or the implementation of 
other sectoral measures, such as production quotas or market sharing agreements, can be viewed as 
forms of disguised protection, rather than true adjustment measures. In recognition of the fact that 
“adjustment policies” could have the opposite effect to that intended, the OECD coined the term 
“positive adjustment policies” to distinguish policies that were not designed to prop up uncompetitive 
industries.  
 
Third, there is the issue of moral hazard. As is well known with insurance, the creation of measures 
that provide compensation in the event of losses resulting from economic change can influence the 
behavior of those who stand to benefit from such measures. Some of the potential effects are a 
reduction in innovation, reduced exit of labor or capital, reduced structural change (e.g., through 
consolidation of firms) that result from an increase in the shadow value of assets with compensation. 
There may also be a tendency for investment to be undertaken in ventures for which the failure rate is 
high, since the cost to the individual of such failure is reduced when measures exist to compensate for 
losses.  
 
Fourth, a related issue is that adjustment policies may generate rent-seeking behavior. Rather than 
focusing on making adjustments that will permit individuals and firms to survive in a competitive 
marketplace, those who stand to benefit from adjustment policies may direct most of their efforts to 
obtaining transfers from the government. This would not be a new development for the agricultural 
sector in industrial countries. The large and continuing subsidies provided by agricultural policies 
have tended to perpetuate rent-seeking behavior by farmers and others involved in the food and 
agricultural sector. The problem might reduced if current policies were to be are replaced by 
adjustment policies, but only if such policies do not become a substitute form of continuing 
subsidization for agriculture. Where there is locational mobility, for example, in agribusiness firms 
and there are competitive adjustment measures across jurisdictions (e.g. counties or states) this may 
accentuate rent seeking behavior on the part of companies. They may close a plant in one region to 
relocate in another simply to maximize the revenue obtained from the adjustment programs on offer in 
the competing location. 
 
  6Fifth, as with all forms of government policies that involve public expenditure, there is the key issue 
of the overall cost of adjustment policies to the economy. Economists identify costless lump-sum 
transfers as the ideal mechanism for addressing the redistributive effects of policy change, but it is 
difficult, if not impossible to design adjustment policies that correspond to this ideal. A major topic in 
the public finance literature is the disincentive effect created by various the forms of taxation that 
fund government budgets. Again, in the case of agriculture, the negative effects of public expenditures 
under adjustment programs would have to be weighed against those created by the continuation of 
existing forms of support to agriculture, and whether the overall size and duration of the transfers to 
agriculture would be reduced by switching from existing support policies to adjustment policies. 
 
Sixth, there is the issue of the relationship between adjustment policies and international trade law. 
The original provisions of the GATT had very little to say on the subject of adjustment measures. 
Article XVI (subsidies) provides for consultation on subsidies that operate directly or indirectly to 
increase exports or to reduce imports, but most of the article addresses export subsidies. In recognition 
of the growing importance of domestic subsidies and other measures since the foundation of the 
GATT, the Uruguay Round Agreement had far greater coverage of these issues. The subsidies and 
countervailing duties code (which specifically excludes agricultural products) provides for disciplines 
on the use of measures that involve the direct or indirect transfer of public funds to enterprises that 
impose injury on another contracting party. It contains explicit references to grants, loss and equity 
infusion, loan guarantees, and tax credits, but excludes non-recurrent measures “which provide time 
for the development of long-term solutions and to avoid acute social problems“. Also excluded are the 
bulk of publicly funded research and assistance to disadvantaged regions that would fall under the 
heading of regional development. In the Agreement on Agriculture, a number of measures within the 
so-called green box category are excluded from reductions in support. Some of these measures fall 
under the heading of adjustment measures e.g., producer and resource retirement schemes), and some 
could be interpreted to fall under that heading, depending on how they are implemented (e.g., 
investment aids, regional assistance). 
  7 
Table 1. Summary of Main  Measures Allowed under the Green Box and the Criteria for their 
Application 
 
Type of Measure  Main Criteria 
General Services
  Must not involve direct payments to producers or processors 
Public 
stockholding  
Volumes governed by legislated food security targets, financial 
transparency, purchase and sale at current market prices 
Domestic food aid   Clearly defined eligibility criteria based on nutritional objectives, financial 
transparency, purchase and sale at current market prices  
Decoupled income 
support  
Clearly defined eligibility criteria for a fixed base period, payments not 
related to the volume of production, prices, or factors of production in any 
year after the base period, no requirement to produce to receive payments 
Income insurance 
and income safety 
nets  
Eligibility based on income loss >30 percent of average gross income for 
the previous three year period or three year average excluding high/low 
from a five year period, compensation less than 70 percent of the income 
loss, no linkage to production, prices or factors of production 
Disaster payments  Production loss >30 percent of the average for the previous three year 
period or three year average excluding high/low from a five year period, 
only for loss of income, livestock, land and other production factors, no 
more than replacement cost and not linked to requirements for future 
production, if during a disaster no more than that required to alleviate 




Clearly defined eligibility criteria to facilitate retirement or switch to non-
agricultural activities, conditional upon total and permanent retirement 




Clearly defined eligibility criteria to remove land or other resources from 
marketable agricultural production, land retirement for a minimum of three 
years, slaughter or definitive permanent disposal of livestock, no required 
alternative use for marketable agricultural production, payments not 
related to volume of production or other resources remaining in production 
Investment aids  Clearly defined eligibility criteria to assist financial or physical 
restructuring for objectively demonstrated structural disadvantages, 
payments not based on production or prices in any year after a base period, 
provided for a fixed period of time, no mandate for future production 




Part of clearly defined environmental or conservation program linked to 
production methods or inputs, payment limited to extra costs or loss of 
income caused by compliance 
Regional 
assistance 
Limited to producers in objectively identified disadvantaged regions, 
payments not based on production in any year after a base period (other 
than to reduce production) or prices, available to all producers in eligible 
regions, limited to extra costs of loss of income related to undertaking 
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